04__DICKERSON.DOC

12/6/2007 8:59:55 AM

INSOLVENCY PRINCIPLES AND THE
ODIOUS DEBT DOCTRINE: THE MISSING
LINK IN THE DEBATE
A. MECHELE DICKERSON*
I
INTRODUCTION
Politicians in this country, as well as many members of the international
human-rights community, view it as fundamentally unfair that the Iraqi people
may be saddled with the debts Saddam Hussein’s brutal regime incurred.
Further, some in the human-rights community generally argue that rich
(creditor) countries have a moral duty or obligation to protect citizens of poor
(debtor) countries and that richer nations should forgive the debts of poorer
nations to help reduce existing inequalities between developed and developing
countries. Until recently, arguments that successor governments should not be
forced to repay the debts of former leaders or regimes relied almost exclusively
on philosophical or humanitarian grounds. This article joins the attempt by
scholars in the insolvency community to shift the discussion from the human
rights, to the insolvency, arena.
The article does not attempt to outline a framework that should be used to
determine whether a debt should be declared odious nor does it propose any
specific entity that should have the authority to determine the odiousness of a
debt. Instead, the article evaluates the doctrine of odious debts using the
insolvency framework found in the United States Bankruptcy Code. Part II of
the article provides a brief overview of sovereign lending and notes that entities
that lend to, or invest in, sovereigns understand ex ante that many of the typical
creditor remedies available upon default (such as repossession of collateral and
replacement of managers) simply are not available in the context of sovereign
lending. Since sovereigns are atypical debtors, their debt restructurings do not
resemble the typical insolvency proceeding or out-of-court workout that involve
business debtors.
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Part III of the article then briefly describes the odious debt doctrine,
discusses instances when it has been invoked to allow a sovereign to repudiate
its debts, and briefly discusses the Iraqi debt situation. In considering what
obligations a sovereign should have to repay a former regime’s debts, the article
emphasizes that even sovereigns who refuse to repay their debts cannot be
liquidated and political leaders who refuse to repay the sovereign’s debts cannot
be replaced by lenders (at least not without military assistance). Thus, like
consumers and businesses that reorganize in bankruptcy, financially troubled
sovereigns will continue to exist notwithstanding their financial crises.
The article concludes by discussing instances where businesses are allowed
to repudiate promises made to groups typically favored in our society
(employees), are allowed to discharge debts owed to favored (often
governmental) creditors, or, are allowed to subordinate certain creditor claims.
Since debt restructuring is designed to rehabilitate people and businesses and to
allow them to perform their core functions, courts allow debtors to break these
promises if forcing debt repayment will prevent a business from rehabilitating
itself in bankruptcy. The article argues that sovereign-debt restructurings
should focus on the need both to rehabilitate the sovereign’s finances and to
allow the new leaders to perform the sovereign’s principal “business” functions.
Since the “business” of a sovereign is principally to provide for the needs of its
citizens and to maintain the country’s physical infrastructure, and a
democratically elected government will be ineffective if it lacks the respect of its
citizens or is unable to provide essential health and human welfare services for
those citizens, it would be justifiable to forgive odious debts if forcing the
sovereign to repay those debts would prevent the sovereign from restructuring
itself politically and financially.
Finally, the article notes that an additional benefit to periodical invocation
of the odious debt doctrine is that it reminds lenders that the doctrine may at
some point gain acceptance in the international financial community. Though
the doctrine may not ever be acknowledged by the lending community,
creditors (like some involved in the Iraqi debts restructuring) will be forced to
bargain during the restructuring in the shadow of the threat that the doctrine
might be invoked and this fear may make some commercial lenders exercise
more caution in the future when extending credit to regimes.
II
SOVEREIGN-DEBT LENDING
A. Private or Public Sector
Although most of the Iraqi debt is owed to other sovereigns,1 sovereign debt
generally is either held by domestic entities or by external private-sector
1. Martin A. Weiss, Iraq’s Debt Relief: Procedure and Potential Implications for International
Debt Relief, Congressional Research Service, Apr. 21, 2006, at 1–2, fig. 1.
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creditors.2 Private-sector sovereign lending generally has vacillated over the last
two centuries between bank and bond lenders. Bond lending was the dominant
form of private-sector, sovereign-debt financing in the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, while bank lending became the norm for most of the
twentieth century. Indeed, commercial banks (largely through medium- to longterm, syndicated bank-loan agreements) were the principal participants in
sovereign lending until the 1990s. In the 1990s, sovereign-debt financing
changed dramatically largely because of losses banks sustained in the Latin
American financial crisis. Starting in the 1990s, the debts sovereigns owed to
banks significantly decreased, and now most sovereign debt (whether domestic
or external private-sector external) is bond debt.3
Most sovereign lending is unsecured. Moreover, even when the lending
ostensibly is secured, sovereign lenders have significantly fewer options upon
default than lenders to commercial entities (or to individuals) possess.4 In
general, sovereign lenders cannot exercise the same rights upon default that
lenders can exercise when the defaulting debtor is a business or a person. For
example, even if a lender has a security interest in the sovereign’s oil revenue or
exports, if the sovereign fails to repay the loan, the lender cannot “seize” or
otherwise take over the sovereign nor can it easily seize control of oil wells or
products located within the sovereign. Indeed, even using the judicial process to
enforce its right to repayment likely will prove difficult for lenders who seek to
sue a sovereign for repayment. If the lender sues in a sovereign court, it is
unlikely that that court would rule in favor of the lender. Suing the sovereign in
another country may not be permitted because sovereign immunity generally
protects nation-states from suit unless they consent. Even when sovereigns have
consented to suit, they generally are sued only in a limited number of other
nations (generally, the United States and the United Kingdom). And, even if
the lender is allowed to sue the sovereign, the success of the litigation depends
largely on the lender’s ability to locate the sovereign’s assets and to sue before
the sovereign has time to move the assets to another location.5

2. Kevin Cowan et al., Sovereign Debt in the Americas: New Data and Stylized Facts, InterAmerican Development Bank, Oct. 2006, at 14, 35, fig. 6, available at http://idbdocs.iadb.org/
wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=846330; Paris Club, Fifty Years of Orderly Sovereign Debt
Restructuring, Proceedings of the International Policy Forum, June 14, 2006, at 21, available at
http://www.clubdeparis.org/cdp/sections/50-ans/anglais_071206web-pdf/downloadFile/file/
anglais_071206web.pdf?nocache=1170431715.92.
3. Cowan et al., supra note 2; A. Mechele Dickerson, A Politically Viable Approach to Sovereign
Debt Restructuring, 53 EMORY L.J. 997, 1012 (2004); Paris Club, supra note 2. See generally Joseph J.
Norton, International Syndicated Lending and Economic Development in Latin America: The Legal
Context, 9 ESSAYS IN INT’L FIN. & ECON. L. 7–8, 10–12 (1997).
4. Dickerson, supra note 3, at 1008.
5. See Patrick Bolton & David A. Skeel, Jr., Redesigning the International Lender of Last Resort, 6
CHI. J. INT’L L. 177, 192–93 (2005) (discussing creditor attempts to seize Argentina’s U.S.-based assets,
including military assets and payments to its embassy); Jill E. Fisch & Caroline M. Gentile, Vultures or
Vanguards?: The Role of Litigation in Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 53 EMORY L.J. 1043, 1084–88
(discussing difficulties creditors face in suits against sovereigns).
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Lenders to sovereigns are also prohibited from exercising a remedy that
lenders to commercial entities increasingly use: forcing the debtor to replace its
management team.6 Lenders routinely condition debt forgiveness (or future
lending) on the willingness of the firm’s board of directors to fire existing
managers or to make other drastic management changes.7 In contrast, without
the support of a well-armed military of their own,8 sovereign lenders lack the
ability to oust a sovereign’s political leaders and install new leaders if the
current leaders refuse to repay the creditor’s debts.
B. International Financial Institutions
In general, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) lends to sovereigns
when private lenders will make loans only on the terms prevailing in the capitalmarkets. The IMF often lends in its capacity as an international development
institution that provides humanitarian aid,9 rather than as a financial institution
whose lending decisions are based on a debtor’s creditworthiness or borrowing
capacity. Some members of the financial community criticize this lending
practice, contending that IMF lending creates a moral-hazard problem by
encouraging sovereigns to borrow recklessly (knowing that an IMF bailout is
likely) and by encouraging creditors to lend recklessly (knowing that the same
bailout will ensure repayment of those imprudent loans).10 Human-rights
activists also criticize IMF lending and policies and accuse the IMF and the
World Bank11 of knowingly lending to repressive regimes who illegally divert
the loan proceeds or use the funds in ways that affirmatively harm the
countries’ citizens.12

6. Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Private Debt and the Missing Lever of Corporate
Governance, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1209, 1228 (2006); Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Control of Wealth
and Bankruptcy, 82 TEX. L. REV. 795, 843 (2004).
7. Douglas G. Baird, The New Face of Chapter 11, 12 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 69, 93 (2004);
Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 6, at 1228; Westbrook, supra note 6, at 843.
8. And, as the current controversy over, and decreasing public support for, the war in Iraq shows,
the lender also would need the support of the people who are funding the effort to oust a political
leader.
9. The IMF is an international organization of 184 member countries established to promote
international monetary cooperation and exchange stability, to foster economic growth, and to provide
temporary financial assistance to countries that are experiencing balance of payments difficulties
caused by, for example, budget deficits, inflation, or currency valuation problems. International
Monetary Fund, Article I—Purposes, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/aa/aa01.htm (last visited June
30, 2007).
10. Some critics suggest that the IMF should focus on providing short-term emergency lending to
sovereigns who face a liquidity crisis rather than acting as a lender of last resort that essentially bails
out the sovereign (and its lenders) or otherwise creates a moral-hazard problem by giving sovereigns an
incentive to engage in opportunistic borrowing. Dickerson, supra note 3, at 1010 n.53.
11. In general, the World Bank provides finance and advice to developing nations to help them
with their economic development, to help them reduce poverty, and to encourage and safeguard
international investments in those developing nations. The World Bank, About Us – History,
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/0,,contentMDK:20653660~menuP
K:72312~pagePK:51123644~piPK:329829~theSitePK:29708,00.html (last visited June 30, 2007).
12. Salil Tripathi, The Corruption Crusader, GUARDIAN UNLIMITED, Mar. 13, 2006,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/comment/story/0,,1730009,00.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2007).
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C. Default
1. Generally
To remedy a financial crisis, some sovereigns may choose to
opportunistically default rather than raise taxes or radically cut public services
for health care or education.13 Though this option is always available, few
sovereigns appear to willingly default or to otherwise indicate that they are
repudiating their financial obligations. Sovereigns appear to avoid repudiating
their debts or seeking a predefault debt restructuring because this might signal
that they are not creditworthy and such a signal would hurt their reputation in,
and access to, international capital markets.14 In addition, even if the sovereign’s
leaders decide to repudiate its financial obligations, the restructuring process is
necessarily a political one that will force leaders to negotiate with all groups
(both domestic and external) affected by the debt restructuring. Leaders
understandably resist restructurings that cause economic dislocation since they
understand that overly burdening the country to repay debts may trigger a
recession, force severe cuts in public expenditures on social programs, or force
them to increase taxes. Leaders who are democratically elected justifiably avoid
taking any of these actions because such actions would cause political upheaval
and may threaten their political careers by giving citizens an incentive to oust
them during the next election cycle.
2. Debt-Restructuring Procedures
Nations are often thwarted in their efforts to repudiate or radically reduce
their debts because there is no uniform international statute, convention, or
treaty that governs sovereign-debt restructurings. Despite recent discussions of
an IMF-sponsored “sovereign debt restructuring mechanism,” international
financial institutions (IFIs), capital market lenders, and debtor-states thus far
have all rejected any attempt to create a permanent sovereign-debtrestructuring mechanism.15 Instead, sovereigns who are in default must use a
multi-step procedure to restructure their debts.
a. Official multilateral or bilateral debt.
Sovereigns can reschedule debts they owe to other sovereigns (official
bilateral debt) through an informal arrangement known as the Paris Club.16 The
Paris Club is an informal group of creditor governments from major
industrialized countries that meets monthly (in Paris) to help debtor nations
restructure their debts. The restructuring procedures used in Paris Club
13. Fisch & Gentile, supra note 5, at 1048–51.
14. Dickerson, supra note 3, at 1007. While Argentina and Ecuador appear to have faced difficulty
getting credit on the capital markets due to their recent defaults, they have been able to issue bonds for
the Venezuelan government. Overseas Development Institute, Re-examining Sovereign Debt:
Forgiveness and Innovation, Sept. 2006, at 4.
15. Weiss, supra note 1, at 11; Paris Club, supra note 2, at 25.
16. The Paris Club, http://www.clubdeparis.org/en/ (last visited June 30, 2007).
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negotiations are generally viewed as closed and not at all transparent. The Paris
Club members will recommend to their countries that they reduce the debts
owed to them only if the IMF has certified that the debtor country cannot meet
its debt-service obligations, the debtor country agrees to comply with certain
policy changes specified by the IMF, and the debtor agrees that it offer terms to
commercial creditors that are not more generous than the terms it negotiated
with the Paris Club.17 Sovereigns and their official creditors tend to reach
agreements quickly (and relatively inexpensively) in a Paris Club rescheduling
and Paris Club restructurings tend to be “successful” largely because public
creditors are willing to make concessions based on geopolitical, nonfinancial
considerations.18
b. Commercial debt.
Private negotiations between sovereigns and their private commercial bank
lenders often occur in an arrangement known as the London Club. London
Club negotiations, in contrast to those conducted during a Paris Club
restructuring, tend to be lengthier and more expensive. Various reasons are
cited for why London Club negotiations are not as efficient as Paris Club
restructurings. First, unlike the relatively limited number of creditor
governments involved with Paris Club restructurings, the considerably larger
number of commercial creditors involved in London Club negotiations makes
reaching an agreement with anything close to unanimous creditor consent
(which is required) difficult. In addition, unlike official public creditors,
commercial entities are less likely to forgive debt merely to solidify future or
geopolitical relationships with the defaulting sovereign.19
3. Role of IFIs
While sovereigns and their public or private creditors are attempting to
restructure a sovereign’s debts, the sovereign often needs working capital. IFIs
are asked (and often expected) to offer new loans to the sovereigns. When the
IMF is the IFI, the loans are conditioned on the sovereign’s agreement to
reform certain economic policies. In addition to the reasons noted earlier, IMF
lending is controversial because many believe the IMF makes loans based on
the economic or political desires of its politically powerful members (often the
United States). These creditor nations, some suggest, insist on an IMF bailout
to protect loans made by the nations’ domestic banking institutions or demand

17. Weiss, supra note 1, at 9. As an example, Malawi’s debts were substantially reduced (from U.S.
$363 million to U.S. $9 million) on October 19, 2006 after it completed requirements imposed by the
IMF initiative for the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries. Specifically, after Malawi agreed to implement
a poverty-reduction strategy and an economic program designed to encourage sustainable economic
growth, the Paris Club members agreed to cancel U.S. $137 million and to grant additional debt relief
of U.S. $217 million to Malawi. Paris Club, News - Malawi, http://www.clubdeparis.org/sections/
traitements/malawi-20061019/switchLanguage/en (last visited Oct. 3, 2007).
18. Dickerson, supra note 3, at 1008–09.
19. Id. at 1009.
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that the IMF provide support packages to countries for geopolitical rather than
economic reasons.20
The World Bank and IMF also provide debt relief to low-income countries
through the Debt Relief Initiative for Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (the
HIPC Initiative) and the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI). Debtor
nations are eligible for the HIPC Initiative if they meet certain income and
indebtedness criteria. Eligible nations also must have a current track record of
satisfactory performance under an IMF program, a Poverty Reduction Strategy
(PRS), or an interim PRS in place, and an agreed plan to clear any arrears to
foreign creditors. In general, the HIPC Initiative requires all creditors
(multilateral, bilateral, or commercial) to help provide a fresh start to debtor
nations and to help those nations reduce poverty. Once debtor nations
accomplish certain goals and reach what is known as “the completion point,”
the debt relief then becomes irrevocable.21
Some critics argue that, despite the program’s good intentions, it is
inadequate because it does not force debtor nations to adequately reduce
poverty or provide basic health care and education for their citizens, and that
countries whose debts are restructured (or forgiven) still remain insolvent and
continue to suffer substantial shortages of capital.22 Finally, critics maintain that
the HIPC Initiative does not allow debtor nations to repudiate odious debts if
they ostensibly have the ability to repay the debts.
III
ODIOUS DEBTS
Many liberal and conservative organizations, both domestically and
internationally, argue that the insolvency process used to resolve the debt crises
of poor nations should be guided by noneconomic factors and that considering
these factors would result in debt cancellation, not simply restructuring. That is,
many outside of the financial community maintain that any insolvency
framework involving sovereign debts should be based on principles related to

20. Daniel K. Tarullo, The Role of the IMF in Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 6 CHI. J. INT’L L. 287,
300 (2005).
21. In general, the debtor country must agree on a short list of completion-point triggers, which
typically includes a continued track record of satisfactory performance on an IMF program; successful
implementation of its poverty reduction strategy; and progress in improving health and education,
governance, or fighting corruption. In essence, debt relief becomes irrevocable only when the debtor
nation has made changes to give its creditors sufficient confidence that the debt relief will not be futile.
The World Bank, News & Broadcast, http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/
0,,contentMDK:20040942~menuPK:34480~pagePK:34370~theSitePK:4607,00.html (last visited June 30,
2007).
22. Africa Action, Critique of the HIPC Initiative, http://www.africaaction.org/action/hipc0206.htm
(last visited June 30, 3007); ANN PETTIFOR, CHAPTER 9/11? RESOLVING INTERNATIONAL DEBT
CRISES—THE JUBILEE FRAMEWORK FOR INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCY 9 (2002), available at
http://www.neweconomics.org/gen/uploads/9-11.pdf.
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justice, morality, and human rights23 and that the citizens of the debtor
sovereign should be given the opportunity to help resolve the sovereign’s
financial crisis and help prevent future crises in a transparent, democratically
accountable framework. Given these views, it is perhaps not surprising that
much of the discussion of the treatment of odious debts has taken place in the
international human-rights—not the insolvency—arena.
A. Origins, and an Explanation, of the Odious Debt Doctrine
Because of the public international law concept of state succession, a new
government remains liable for the debts of its predecessor governments. Thus,
whether the sovereign’s political leaders are replaced as the result of a
democratic process, a violent overthrow, or a war, the new government remains
obligated to repay debts to its private, official bilateral, or internationalorganization creditors. Successor governments remain liable for the old
regime’s debts because of the view that those debts represent obligations of the
state—not the debts of any particular political party or leader.24
Since a sovereign should incur only those debts that are in its interests, a
number of political theorists, human-rights groups, and religious organizations
reject the notion that a country should be forced to repay debts that were not
incurred in the sovereign’s interests.25 The odious debt doctrine provides an
exception to the general rule that successor governments remain liable for a
prior regime’s debts. In general, debts are considered odious if a despotic or
autocratic leader or regime borrowed the money but did not use it to benefit
the country’s citizens and the creditors knew that the funds would be used to
benefit the corrupt leaders or to finance harmful activities like genocide and
other human-rights violations. In its earliest formulation, the doctrine provided
that when an autocratic or despotic regime borrows to strengthen its reign or to
repress the citizens of the country—not to provide for the needs or interest of
the sovereign—then, if and when the despot goes, so should the debt.26 Such
23. Africa Action, supra note 22 (argument by Africa advocacy group that many of the debts of
African nations are illegitimate and should be cancelled); Nile Gardiner & Marc Miles, Forgive the
Iraqi Debt, The Heritage Foundation, Apr. 30, 2003, available at http://www.heritage.org/
Research/TradeandForeignAid/em871.cfm (discussing the economic and moral imperative of forgiving,
not restructuring, the Iraqi debt); PETTIFOR, supra note 22, at 4.
24. Sean Hagan, The IMF’s Role in a Post-Conflict Situation, 38 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 59, 59–60
(2006); NANCY BIRDSALL & JOHN WILLIAMSON, DELIVERING ON DEBT RELIEF: FROM IMF GOLD
TO A NEW AID ARCHITECTURE 52 (2002).
25. For an example, Jubilee USA—the U.S. arm of the international organization Jubilee
Research—is a network of more than seventy religious or faith groups (including the Evangelical
Lutheran Church in America, the Mennonite Central Committee, the Presbyterian Church USA, and
the Sisters of the Holy Cross), environmental and labor organizations, community groups, and research
institutes. Jubilee USA engages in public education and research and policy analyses that advocate debt
cancellation for impoverished countries. See Jubilee USA Network, Who is Jubilee USA?,
http://www.jubileeusa.org/jubilee.cgi?path=/about_the_network/member_organizations&page=who_ar
e_we.html (last visited Jan. 1, 2007).
26. See Anna Gelpern, What Iraq and Argentina Might Learn from Each Other, 6 CHI. J. INT’L L.
391, 403 (2005) (discussing historical development of the concept); Alexander N. Sack, Les Effets des
Transformations des Etats sur leurs Dettes Publiques et Autres Obligations Financieres, in ODIOUS
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debts should be treated as personal debts of the former despot (or regime), not
as an obligation of the current regime or the citizens of the sovereign. To do
otherwise, it is argued, would force people to pay for their own repression.27
Under this doctrine, creditors (including IFIs) with knowledge that a
political leader incurred debts to strengthen his regime, to repress political
opponents, or to serve manifestly personal interests unrelated to the sovereign’s
interests would not be entitled to full repayment of those debts. Because such a
debt was designed to benefit only the governing regime, not the citizens of the
sovereign, under most formulations of the odious debt doctrine, the new regime
would have the burden of proving that the prior regime’s debts did not serve
the interest of the sovereign and that the creditors had knowledge of how the
funds were being used. If the creditors failed to rebut proof that the funds were
not used to benefit the sovereign, then the debt would be deemed
unenforceable.28
Some human-rights activists argue for a broader conceptualization of the
doctrine whereby, in addition to the cancellation of odious debts, all
“illegitimate debt” should be cancelled. 29 That is, loans would be cancelled if
they were against the law or not sanctioned by applicable law; were unfair,
improper or objectionable; or infringed public policy. Others argue that any
debts of developing nations that arose because of “bad” lending policies or
practices by private lenders or creditor nations should be written off.30

DEBTS: LOOSE LENDING, CORRUPTION, AND THE THIRD WORLD’S ENVIRONMENTAL LEGACY 165
(Patricia Adams trans., 1991), available at http://www.odiousdebts.org/odiousdebts/index.cfm?DSP=
content&ContentID=7759 (last visited Feb. 2, 2007).
27. Or, as stated by an Iraqi political leader, lenders who demand that Iraq repay Saddam
Hussein’s debts are, in essence, asking them “to pay for the knives they gave Saddam to slaughter us.”
Jubilee Iraq, http://www.jubileeiraq.org/files/iraqiviews.pdf (last visited Jan. 1, 2007).
28. PATRICIA ADAMS, ODIOUS DEBTS: LOOSE LENDING, CORRUPTION, AND THE THIRD
WORLD’S ENVIRONMENTAL LEGACY ch. 17, available at http://www.probeinternational.org/probeint/
OdiousDebts/OdiousDebts/chapter17.html (last visited Dec. 11, 2006).
29. Africa Action, supra note 22 (argument by Africa advocacy group that many of the debts of
African nations are illegitimate and should be cancelled); Joyce Mulama, Debt the Illegitimate Legacy
of Africa’s Dictators, IPS NEWS, Jan. 26, 2007, available at http://www.zmag.org/content/
showarticle.cfm?ItemID=11957 (reporting discussions at 2007 World Social Forum meeting where
attendees characterized debts of poor countries as illegitimate); Paris Club, supra note 2, at 21, 62
(statement of advocacy officer for Eurodad: “It is high time that creditors take responsibility for their
acts, acknowledge the existence of illegitimate debts and cancel them unconditionally.”).
30. For example, one commentator suggests that the following debts should be deemed
illegitimate: loans made to known corrupt officials; loans for “obviously bad projects”; and loans with
usurious interest rates. JOSEPH HANLON, DEFINING ILLEGITIMATE DEBT AND LINKING ITS
CANCELLATION TO ECONOMIC JUSTICE (2002), available at http://www.odiousdebts.org/odiousdebts/
publications/DefiningIllegtimateDebt.pdf.
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B. Invocation of the Doctrine of Odious Debts
1. Early Use of the Odious Debt Doctrine
Human-rights activists concede that the notion of allowing a successor
regime to repudiate debts incurred by prior regimes is controversial.31 Humanrights scholars stress, though, that the United States was one of the first nations
to rely on the doctrine to refuse to repay debts. For example, after the United
States won the Spanish-American War and seized Cuba from Spain, Spain
demanded that the United States repay Cuba’s debts to Spain. The United
States refused this demand—not because the debts imposed an excessive
burden on it—but because the loans had been imposed on the citizens of Cuba
without their consent. Moreover, the United States contended that Spain
understood the risky nature of lending to Cuba ex ante. In applying the concept
of odious debts (and, consequently, refusing to pay Cuba’s debts), the United
States essentially argued that forcing Cuba to repay these debts would have
perpetuated Spain’s oppression of the Cuban people.32
Another such example was a 1923 arbitration involving debts owed a
Canadian lender by Costa Rica. Former President and U.S. Supreme Court
Chief Justice William H. Taft was the sole arbitrator in this dispute. Justice Taft
initially reaffirmed the basic principle that successor governments are required
to repay the debts of their predecessors. But he concluded that Costa Rica
could unilaterally repudiate the debt owed to the lender because the loan had
been incurred not to benefit Costa Rican citizens but to finance the leader’s
(and his brother’s) escape from Costa Rica and because the lender knew (or
should have known) those intentions.33
2. Recent Demands to Apply the Doctrine
The crisis in Iraq and the burgeoning costs associated with the war there
have increased the interest of U.S. politicians in the odious debt doctrine and
have renewed the call in the international human-rights community for the
recognition and application of the doctrine to the mounting Iraqi debt. While
everyone understood that some of the Iraqi debt had to be cancelled, some
commentators suggested that no future Iraqi government should be forced to
repay any of the debts associated with Saddam Hussein’s brutal regime.34 The

31. One critic characterized the doctrine as “an indeterminate, doctrinal impediment to the
reemergence of a local economy in the global markets . . . .” Hiram Chodosh, Rebuilding Nation
Building: An Introduction, 38 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 1, 3 (2006).
32. ADAMS, supra note 28, at ch. 17; Ed Kinane, Don’t Saddle Iraqi People with Saddam’s Bloody
Debts, POST-STANDARD, Dec. 18, 2005, at D1.
33. Gelpern, supra note 26, at 411 (describing arbitration proceeding).
34. Bill Day, The Burden of Odious Debt, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, Dec. 27, 2003, at 2H;
Frida Ghitis, Iraq Burden; Where Credit Was Overdue . . ., CHI. TRIB., Jan. 18, 2004, at C1; Editorial,
Iraq’s Debt Must Be Forgiven, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Oct. 23, 2003, at B7; Editorial, Iraq’s
Odious Debts, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Dec. 22, 2003, at 4; Maura Reynolds, Bush Taps Baker for Iraq Task;
The Former Secretary of State and Longtime Family Ally Is Named a Presidential Envoy. His Job Is to
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current Bush Administration appears to have helped convince other nations to
forgive billions of Iraq’s debts based, in part, on the Administration’s concern
that Hussein used the money to buy arms or build castles.35 Other recent
invocations of the doctrine on the Iraqi citizens’ behalf include legislation
introduced in Congress that would have encouraged the IMF and World Bank
to waive much of the debt incurred during the Hussein regime and legislation
involving proposed aid to Iraq.36
No one seems to know (or is willing to admit) the total amount of Iraq’s
foreign debt obligations.37 When Saddam Hussein gained power in Iraq in 1979,
the amount of Iraq’s long-term foreign debt was insignificant, and it had cash
reserves of $36 billion. But costs associated with Hussein’s invasion of Iran
(with the blessing of the United States) and his invasion of Kuwait in 1990
significantly increased Iraq’s debts. Most agree that much of that debt is owed
to other countries (most notably, France, Russia, and other Arab nations).38 In
addition to the borrowing during Hussein’s regime, Iraq’s debts continue to
mount because of the remaining unpaid Gulf War reparation claims filed with
the United Nations Compensation Commission based on the damage Hussein
(and, thus, Iraq) inflicted on Kuwait, its oil fields, and Kuwaiti citizens. The
amount of external debts tied to Hussein’s regimes is estimated to be $125
billion, though some reports suggest it might actually exceed $200 billion.39 And,
it is too early to determine how much it will cost to rebuild Iraq whenever the
war ends or to quantify the amount of lost development efforts associated with
the ongoing war. In addition to the costs to finance the physical infrastructure
that has been destroyed during the war, the new Iraqi government will also face
massive costs involving the health, education, and general welfare needs of the
Iraqi people.

Sway Creditors to Ease the War-Torn Nation’s Steep Debt, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 6, 2003, at A1; Craig S.
Smith, Baghdad Bank Plundered as Iraq’s Economy Falters, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 2003, at B1.
35. Editorial, Keeping Iraqi Elections on Track, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 23, 2004, at C20;
David R. Francis, Sweet Victory Ahead on Debt Relief?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, June 2, 2005, at 17.
36. Senator Evan Bayh commenting on the rationale behind the legislation, stated, “[I]f you do
business by extending loans to dictators, you assume the risk of nonrepayment in the event that those
dictators are overthrown. This is truly ‘odious debt,’ to use the term employed by international lawyers.
The Iraqi people have the right to repudiate this debt. If they do not, the other nations that incurred it
surely should do the right thing by forgiving it.” 149 Cong. Rec. S12673 (daily ed. Oct. 16, 2003)
(statement of Sen. Bayh). Ironically, the purpose of this amendment was to convert a grant into a loan
because of Sen. Bayh’s concern that it would be unfair for Russia, France, Germany, and other nations
to be repaid (since they “propped up the tyrannical regime of Saddam Hussein”) while the United
States received nothing. See id.
37. Paul Blustein, G-7 Agrees That Iraq Needs Help With Debt; Important Roles Seen for IMF,
World Bank, WASH. POST., Apr. 13, 2003, at A37; Weiss, supra note 1, at 1–2 (discussing disagreements
on what Iraq owes and how interest on that debt should be calculated).
38. Weiss, supra note 1, at 1.
39. Reynolds, supra note 34, at A1; Smith, supra note 34, at B1; Editorial, Iraq’s Debt Must Be
Forgiven, supra note 34, at B7; Weiss, supra note 1, at 1–2. Not surprisingly, nations that lent to Iraq—
especially those that helped finance the war with Iran—are not forthcoming about the amounts they are
owed or the nature of the lending. Jim Hoagland, Iraq Is One Place Where Sanctions Might Work,
WASH. POST, Sept. 15, 1988, at A25.
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Just as U.S. politicians, scholars, and members of the human-rights
community argue that Iraq should not be forced to repay Hussein’s odious
debts, the relatively recent debts of several other nations are also arguably
subject to the odious debt doctrine. At the end of the brutal apartheid regime in
South Africa, the human-rights community also argued that the apartheid-era
debts should be forgiven because of their odious nature. The Truth and
Reconciliation Commission campaigned for apartheid-era debts to be written
off since so many of the loan proceeds were used to oppress black South
Africans and to finance the apartheid military and police state. The new South
African leaders did not repudiate the debts, most likely because they were
concerned that doing so would harm the country’s ability to attract foreign
investment.40 Likewise, perhaps for similar reasons, despite the suspect nature of
loans incurred by “Baby Doc” Duvalier of Haiti, Ferdinand Marcos of
Philippines, Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire/Congo, President Suharto of Indonesia,
and by former (and current) regimes in Rwanda and Nigeria, to date, at least,
none of these countries has formally repudiated its debts.41
C. Current Opposition to the Doctrine
The international financial community, including IFIs, has rejected the
validity of the odious debt doctrine. Specifically, the IMF and other NGOs have
resisted efforts to interfere with contractual relations between a sovereign and
its lenders by disqualifying odious debt from repayment. Representatives of the
IMF have stated that such interference would constitute a radical change in the
validity of creditor claims and the sanctity of contracts and that such a change
would have adverse implications for the operation of capital markets.42 The IMF
appears to have accepted the contentions of capital market investors that
introducing the new risk factor of potentially having their debts deemed odious
and thus unenforceable would undermine the efficient operation of secondary
sovereign bond markets and would have an adverse effect on emerging-market
borrowers to issue bonds in the primary bond markets.43
The World Bank and the IMF consistently take the position that pressuring
private lenders to voluntarily cancel debts would in the long run destabilize
international lending and retard economic growth in developing countries.44
These IFIs as well as private lenders argue that allowing subsequent regimes to

40. See Michael Kremer & Seema Jayachandran, Odious Debt, 39 FIN. & DEV., June 2002, at 36;
Report of the Reparation & Rehabilitation Committee, Reparations and the Business Sector, at 143,
http://www.info.gov.za/otherdocs/2003/trc/2_5.pdf.
41. For a discussion of those debts, see Kremer & Jayachandran, supra note 40, at 2.
42. International Monetary Fund, Proposals for a Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism
(SDRM), IMF Factsheet, http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/sdrm.htm (last visited Mar. 31, 2007).
43. See Jack Boorman, Address at the Carnegie Council on Ethics and Int’l Affairs: Dealing Justly
with Debt (Apr. 30, 2003), http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2003/043003.htm; Raghuram Rajan,
Straight Talk Debt Relief and Growth: How to Craft an Optimal Debt Relief Proposal, FIN. & DEV.,
June 2005, at 56, available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2005/06/straight.htm.
44. International Monetary Fund, supra note 42.
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repudiate the debts of prior regimes violates the sanctity of contracts and,
moreover, would create chaos in the international financial markets. Critics of
the odious debt doctrine maintain that an ex post declaration that a debt is
odious is unfair and not supported by general commercial principles since it is
hard to anticipate which loans might be considered odious in the future. This
risk of uncertainty would make lenders less likely to lend to the existing regime
(even if legitimately elected) and would make lenders less likely to make loans
to any developing nation. At least with respect to Iraq, supporters of the odious
debt doctrine vigorously dispute this assertion, maintaining instead that the
restructured Iraq would have little difficulty in the capital markets given the
enormously profitable oil contracts that likely will be available in future years.45
Even though the World Bank does not support cancellation of odious debt,
it has recently indicated that it will limit loans to leaders of countries deemed to
be corrupt. That is, the Bank has indicated that it would change the way it
designed and approved development projects for poor countries: the more
likely it is that the money will be misused, the less likely it is that that the World
Bank will dispense funds.46 Indeed, funds the Bank promised to lend to
countries (including India, Chad, Argentina, and Kenya) were either suspended
or reduced because of these concerns.47
IV
USING AN INSOLVENCY FRAMEWORK
TO ANALYZE THE ODIOUS DEBT DOCTRINE
A number of scholars and commentators, including many who are
participating in this symposium, have proposed factors to determine whether a
debt is odious so as to ensure that lenders can consider ex ante the risk
associated with lending to a particular regime. They have also proposed the best
way to structure a risk premium to compensate for an increased likelihood that
a loan can be repudiated because of the odious nature of the debt.48 Likewise,
scholars, economists, and those in the international human-rights community
have suggested giving various entities the authority to determine whether a
particular debt should be deemed odious.49 The purpose of this article, however,

45. At least with respect to Iraq, supporters of the odious debt doctrine vigorously dispute this
assertion, maintaining instead that the restructured Iraq would have little difficulty in the capital
markets given the enormously profitable oil contracts that likely will be available in future years.
ADAMS, supra note 28, at ch. 17.
46. The World Bank, World Bank Group Historical Chronology 2005 (to September),
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/EXTARCHIVES/0,,contentMDK:
20654185~menuPK:1689560~pagePK:36726~piPK:437378~theSitePK:29506,00.html (last visited Mar.
31, 2007).
47. Sebatian Mallaby, Wolfowitz’s Corruption Agenda, WASH. POST., Feb. 20, 2006, at A21.
48. Odious Debts & State Corruption, held at Duke University School of Law, Jan. 26, 2007.
49. Commentators have suggested that an international NGO, a commission similar to the U.S.–
Iran Claim Commission, an international commission that operated under the purview of the United
Nations, an independent arbitration system, or a generally respected institution, group, or person could
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is not to propose specific insolvency procedures that should be used to
restructure odious debts. Likewise, the article does not attempt to determine
whether an arbitration panel, an existing nongovernmental organization (NGO)
or international organization, or the sovereign itself should have the authority
to determine whether any particular debt is odious. Instead, the remainder of
this article incorporates insolvency principles into the odious debt debate in an
attempt to respond to the claim that allowing sovereigns to repudiate odious
debt violates the basic principle that contracts must always be honored. Thus,
from an insolvency perspective, if an agreed-upon entity (say, Congress) applies
clear factors (as, for example, those in a federal bankruptcy statute) to
determine whether a creditor’s claim may be repaid, the debtor sovereign
should be allowed to repudiate its debts only if doing so would enhance the
sovereign’s ability to effectively reorganize itself politically and financially.
Although this article does not attempt to specify factors that should be used
to determine the odiousness of a debt, it explicitly rejects the argument
advanced by some in the human-rights community that a democratically elected
regime should have the ability to repudiate all loans simply because the loan
was made to “illegitimate” governments50 or that the new government should be
able to reject loans it could repay without compromising its ability to
restructure itself financially and politically. Given the difficulties associated with
categorizing regimes as odious or nonodious, 51 the focus of an odious-debt
analysis in an insolvency context simply should not be whether the regime is
democratically elected. Adopting such an approach would allow all new
democratically elected regimes to repudiate all debts of former despotic or
autocratic regimes. Moreover, an interpretation of the odious debt doctrine
providing that all debts of a despotic regime could be repudiated by future
regimes would suggest that despotic regimes never borrow funds or use those
funds to build or repair buildings and roads, or otherwise improve the country’s
infrastructure.52 The United Nations (U.N.) monitors nations’ activities to
determine whether the nation (or its leaders) threatens world peace, and
Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and other organizations monitor
countries accused of violating the human rights of their citizens.53 However,
neither these nor any other independent international institution have the
authority to proclaim that any particular regime is odious; indeed, Amnesty
International’s governing documents provide that it does not support or oppose
assess the legitimacy of debts. Kremer & Jayachandran, supra note 40, at 39; Jubilee USA Network,
supra note 25; Rajan, supra note 43.
50. HANLON, supra note 30.
51. Patrick Bolton & David Skeel, Odious Debts or Odious Regimes?, 70 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. (forthcoming Autumn 2007).
52. Of course, some would suggest that future lenders would stop lending to despots if they knew
that loans to odious leaders could be repudiated by a democratically elected government.
53. Amnesty International, About Amnesty International, http://web.amnesty.org/pages/aboutaiindex-eng (last visited Jan. 1, 2007); Human Rights Watch (HRW), About HRW,
http://www.hrw.org/about/ (last visited Jan. 1, 2007); United Nations Security Council, Functions and
Powers, http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_functions.html (last visited Jan. 1, 2007).
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any government or political system.54 The focus for any insolvency analysis of
the odious debt doctrine should be on the use of the loan proceeds by the
odious regime rather than a blanket declaration that all debts incurred by an
odious regime can be repudiated.55
A. Sovereigns, Individuals, and Businesses
Unlike restructuring procedures applied to businesses or individuals under
the Code, restructuring a sovereign’s debt poses particular challenges: turnover
managers cannot be dispatched to manage the sovereign that has defaulted on
its loans and creditors cannot easily repossess the collateral that secures their
debts. Like individuals, however, a sovereign will continue to exist whether it
repays odious debts, refuses to repay those debts, or has the debts forgiven.
And—whether or not the sovereign is deemed to have value—a sovereign (like
a business reorganizing under Chapter 11) that cannot pay all its debts will
continue to exist and operate as a sovereign. For these reasons, the Code’s
treatment of the debts of consumers and Chapter 11 debtors is instructive.
B. Basic Insolvency Principles
The Code’s fresh-start policy recognizes that a consumer will continue to
exist even after he receives the bankruptcy discharge—the discharge ends the
person’s contractual obligations, not the person himself. Likewise, Chapter 11 is
specifically designed to help valuable albeit financially distressed businesses
restructure their debts, then continue to operate and contribute to the
American economy. Given these policies, not all of an individual’s assets are
liquidated simply because she cannot pay her debts, and businesses are often
allowed to shed their debts but not be liquidated if they are deemed to be worth
more as an ongoing concern than their parts would be worth if sold piecemeal
in a liquidation.
Bankruptcy, at its core, lets debtors legally breach their contracts. Thus,
whereas creditors are correct that the odious debt doctrine violates the sanctity
of contracts, insolvency systems are, by design, used to reorder a debtor’s

54. Amnesty International, supra note 53.
55. As one commentator noted, it would be unfair to penalize investors simply because they loaned
money to Hussein, for many of them may have relied on the December 20, 1983 picture of the special
envoy from President Reagan—former U.S. Defense Secretary Rumsfeld—shaking Hussein’s hand. See
Press Release, The National Security Archive, U.S. Documents Show Embrace of Saddam Hussein in
Early 1980s Despite Chemical Weapons, External Aggression, Human Rights Abuses (Feb. 25, 2003),
available at http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB82/press.htm. Likewise, lenders may
generally have relied on the U.S.’s former support of Hussein, notwithstanding his brutal, despotic
regime, in deciding to loan money to Iraq. Stated differently, whereas it is reasonable to expect that
lenders monitor the use of the loan proceeds, short of hiring human-rights consultants to determine
whether the existing regime is “odious,” it is unclear how the lenders would know that lending to
Hussein was per se improper when U.S. officials supported his brutal regime (as long as he was invading
Iran or otherwise tormenting a U.S. enemy) and encouraged lenders to invest in Iraq. Gelpern, supra
note 26, at 412; Guy Gugliotta, Bush, Others Said to Have Repeatedly Pressed Bank to Aid Iraq, WASH.
POST., Feb. 25, 1992, at A13.
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contractual obligations, even if this results in a breach. The specific provisions
that govern business reorganizations under Chapter 11 and consumer
bankruptcies under both Chapters 7 and 13 of the Code allow businesses and
people to restructure some debts and to repudiate all or parts of others in order
to give the business or person a fresh start in life. For example, whereas the
Code generally respects the sanctity of contracts and gives creditors formal
“notice” of how their claims can be affected in a bankruptcy case,
knowledgeable creditors understand that bankruptcy cases—especially a
Chapter 11 reorganization—typically are a negotiated process and the result of
the negotiation may be that they will receive less than they are entitled to under
the terms of their contract. Indeed, large Chapter 11 reorganizations are
essentially a series of negotiations between a Debtor in Possession (DIP), the
DIP’s prepetition creditors and shareholders, lenders who provide financing to
the DIP during the reorganization, and the DIP’s future lenders and owners.
Because few claims are absolutely sacrosanct in bankruptcy, creditors know that
certain Code provisions let the debtor, trustee in bankruptcy, and DIP alter the
treatment the creditor’s claim would have had under applicable nonbankruptcy
laws.
1. Modifying Secured Claims
Most secured creditors can expect either to be paid in full in a bankruptcy
proceeding or to receive the collateral that secures their debts.56 Likewise,
although the Code provides that Chapter 11 reorganization plans can modify
the rights of the holders of secured claims, the expectation created under state
law that a creditor will be repaid (or be allowed to seize the collateral) typically
is not frustrated simply because the debtor sought to restructure its debts in
bankruptcy.57 Though the Code generally respects the protections creditors
receive under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, at times those
protections are curtailed.
For example, to discourage a debtor from granting “secret” liens and
inducing other creditors to extend credit because of mistaken beliefs concerning
the debtor’s financial situation, Article 9 provides that other creditors or bona
fide purchasers of real property would not be bound by a creditor’s unperfected
security interest.58 However, the security interest would be enforceable against
the debtor. In bankruptcy cases, though, the trustee or DIP has the authority to
avoid a creditor’s security interest if the creditor failed to properly perfect that
interest. Thus a creditor who otherwise would have been entitled to repayment
in full from the debtor as a secured creditor under state law could find that it
will treated as an unsecured creditor in bankruptcy and, as a result, be repaid
only a small percentage of its debt.59

56.
57.
58.
59.

11 U.S.C. §§ 725, 1129(b)(2)(A) (2000).
Id. § 1123(b)(5).
U.C.C. § 9-317 (2001).
11 U.S.C. § 544 (2000).
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2. Modifying Unsecured Claims
As is true outside of bankruptcy, creditors who have unsecured claims
receive fewer protections in bankruptcy than do secured creditors. Since most
sovereign lending is unsecured, it is especially appropriate to consider how the
Code might modify the rights of unsecured creditors. For example, unsecured
creditors who receive payments during the period immediately before the
debtor files for bankruptcy can, in some instances, be required to return those
preferential payments even though the creditor almost always would be allowed
to keep the payments under applicable state law.60 The Code forces creditors
who receive preferential payments to return these payments in most cases to
avoid disrupting the Code’s payment-priority scheme.61 Although a creditor who
is forced to disgorge a preferential payment is still entitled to seek repayment of
the debt during the bankruptcy proceeding, depending on the debt–asset ratio
and the terms of the Chapter 11 or 13 plan, the creditor may receive less in the
bankruptcy case than the amount the creditor was forced to return to the
debtor’s bankruptcy estate as a preference.62 Though the preference provisions
are designed to discourage creditors from racing to dismantle a financially ailing
debtor as it slides into insolvency, even a creditor who does not engage in
aggressive prepetition collection activities or does not threaten a debtor in
order to get a preferential payment nonetheless must disgorge the payment.
Although, in general, debtors cannot use a bankruptcy filing to rewrite their
contracts or leases, the Code allows debtors to affect the rights of entities with
whom they have contracted. The Code lets debtors reject (that is, refuse to
perform) unfavorable contracts or leases.63 And, although the Code typically
treats claims that arose after the debtor filed for bankruptcy more favorably
than claims that arose before the filing, it provides that any damages resulting
from the debtor’s postpetition breach of contract will be treated as if the breach
occurred before the bankruptcy case was filed.64 Again, though the contracting
party may have done absolutely nothing wrong, the Code gives the debtor the
right to convert what should be a favored postpetition claim that is entitled to

60. Id. § 547(b). Under most state fraudulent transfer laws, only insiders who have knowledge that
the debtor is insolvent will be forced to return preferential payments. See Unif. Fraudulent Transfer
Act 5(b).
61. Creditors who do not improve their financial positions relative to other similarly situated
creditors may be allowed to keep preferential payments by relying on one of the preference exceptions
found in 11 U.S.C. § 547(c).
62. Upon filing a petition for relief in bankruptcy, an estate that consists of the entire debtor’s
property, “wherever located and by whomever held,” is created. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a). Unsecured
creditors—who rarely are paid in full in a Chapter 11 bankruptcy—can be especially harmed if they are
forced to return preferential payments. For example, an unsecured creditor who exercises its states’
collection law remedies to, and receives payment in full of, its $100 debt during the ninety days
preceding the bankruptcy would be forced to disgorge the $100 payment. If it receives only a ten
percent distribution in the bankruptcy proceeding (or $10), it would feel as if not being allowed to keep
the $90 caused it harm in an economic sense, especially since the creditor did nothing impermissible in
obtaining full repayment before the company filed for bankruptcy.
63. 11 U.S.C. § 365(a).
64. 11 U.S.C. § 365(a), 502(g)(1).
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repayment in full into a prepetition claim that likely will be paid only a small
percentage.
3. Eliminating Favored Claims
Other favored creditors may face even more draconian treatment in
bankruptcy. Former employees of companies owed pension or other employee
benefits, creditors owed student-loan payments from debtors who cannot repay
those debts without undue hardship, and secured creditors deemed to have
engaged in inequitable conduct can all have their claims dramatically
restructured, or even discharged, in a bankruptcy case. These creditors likely
would conclude that principles embodied in the Code allowing this treatment
violate the sanctity of their contracts by letting debtors repudiate debts that
were otherwise valid.
D. The Corporate Bankruptcy Model and Odious Debt
1. “Legacy” Costs in Bankruptcy
Businesses in industries with high labor costs increasingly use Chapter 11 to
restructure their “legacy” costs. Legacy costs generally are defined as defined
benefit (DB) pension obligations, retiree medical benefits, and collectivebargaining agreements (CBAs).65 In general, businesses cannot reject a CBA,
and they are required to continue making retiree-benefit payments during the
course of the Chapter 11 case. Moreover, the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) provides that a company can terminate a
retirement plan only if it shows that it will be unable to repay all its debts under
a Chapter 11 reorganization plan and that it would be unable to continue in
business outside of bankruptcy.66 The Code and ERISA make it difficult for
businesses to terminate or modify employee-benefit plans. This protects the
retirement security of workers, advances the public policy that favors collective
bargaining,67 and increasingly prevents businesses from shifting their liability to
their employees onto the Pension Benefits Guaranty Corporation (PBGC).68
65. See generally Dan Keating, Good Intentions, Bad Economics: Retiree Insurance Benefits in
Bankruptcy, 43 VAND. L. REV. 161, 163 (1990) (arguing that the passage of Section 1114 of the
Bankruptcy Code does little to increase the likelihood that retirees will receive benefits and pensions
under corporate Chapter 11 restructuring).
66. 29 U.S.C. § 1342(c)(2)(B)(ii)(I)–(IV) (2000).
67. See In re Northwest Airlines Corp., 346 B.R. 307, 314 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006).
68. The PBGC is a wholly owned government corporation formed to protect employees from
employers who underfunded (or failed to fund) their pension plans. The PBGC is statutorily required
to provide timely and uninterrupted benefit payments. 29 U.S.C. § 1302(a). Though the PBGC was
created to insure that vested participants in DB plans receive the benefits their employers promised
them, the PBGC itself is facing a financial crisis. That is, while the PBGC had a $9.7 billion surplus in
2000, by the end of 2005, it had almost a $25 billion deficit. In re Kaiser Aluminum Corp., 456 F.3d 328,
346 (3d Cir. 2006). This multi-billion dollar deficit has caused the PBGC to routinely oppose
companies’ attempts to terminate their pension obligations in Chapter 11 reorganization proceedings.
Id. at 328 (PBGC opposition to termination of pension plan); In re UAL Corp. (pilots’ pension plan
termination), 468 F.3d 444 (7th Cir. 2006) (PBGC opposition to termination of pension plan). As a
result of the termination of the U.S. Airways and United Airlines’ pension plans, the PBGC had claims
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Because federal law and policies do not favor allowing employers to
repudiate their promises to their current or former employees, a business
attempting to reorganize under Chapter 11 may reject a CBA69 or modify
retiree benefits70 only if it shows that these changes are necessary for the
business to reorganize, if it assures that all affected parties are treated fairly and
equitably, and if the treatment of the legacy costs is “clearly favored by the
balance of the equities.”71 In determining whether the balance of the equities
favors terminating or modifying the employee-benefit claims, courts consider a
number of factors, including whether the debtor is likely to liquidate if it cannot
modify its debts to the employees, whether other creditors’ claims will be
harmed if the legacy costs remain in place, the good or bad faith of the parties
in dealing with the debtor’s financial situation, and the relative abilities of the
various parties to spread the costs associated with maintaining (or modifying)
the legacy costs.72
Businesses that can show they cannot successfully reorganize and compete
in the marketplace unless they terminate (or modify) their legacy costs likely
would be allowed to breach their contractual promises to make future
compensation payments to their employees (in the form of pensions or retiree
medical benefits). Indeed, over the last two decades, steel and airline
companies73 have used Chapter 11 to terminate or severely reduce their legacy
costs74 even though their employees had already agreed to lower wages in the
past, likely in exchange for receiving these future benefits.75 Courts have
increasingly allowed large airlines and steel companies to breach their CBAs or
to otherwise terminate their pension plans when the company proved (or at
least asserted) that it could not get debt or equity financing to reorganize and
emerge from bankruptcy.76 Courts appear willing to let businesses use Chapter
of $9.7 billion. Because of unfunded benefit guarantees, it is projected that the PBGC will run out of
money by 2022. Julie Kosterlitz, Pinched Promises, NAT’L. J., Sept. 3, 2005, at 2650–51.
69. 11 U.S.C. § 1113 (2000).
70. Id. § 1114.
71. Id. § 1114(g). Debtors are also required to send the retirees’ representative a proposal that
explains how the debtor intends to treat the retirees’ benefits claim and to make a good faith effort to
confer with the representative to discuss the proposed modification. In re Delta Air Lines, 342 B.R.
685, 693–94 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006) (discussing requirements).
72. In re Northwest Airlines Corp., 346 B.R. 307, 329 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006).
73. Bethlehem Steel, LTV, National Steel, Kaiser Aluminum Corp., U.S. Airways, Delta Airlines,
and United Airlines are among the companies who have used bankruptcy to reduce their legacy costs.
Since 2000, there have been twenty-two airline bankruptcy filings. U.S. GOV’T. ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE, COMMERCIAL AVIATION: BANKRUPTCY AND PENSION PROBLEMS ARE SYMPTOMS OF
UNDERLYING STRUCTURAL ISSUES 3 (2005).
74. See, e.g., In re Delta Air Lines, 342 B.R. at 685 (seeking rejection of CBA with flight
attendants); In re Kaiser Aluminum Corp., 456 F.3d 328 (3d Cir. 2006) (seeking termination of pension
plan); In re Northwest Airlines Corp., 346 B.R. at 307 (seeking rejection of CBA); In re U.S. Airways
Group, Inc., 296 B.R. at 734 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2003) (seeking termination of pilots’ pension plan). See
Kosterlitz, supra note 68, at 2651.
75. See Dan Keating, Why the Bankruptcy Reform Act Left Labor Legacy Costs Alone, 71 MO. L.
REV. 985 (2006).
76. In re U.S. Airways, 296 B.R. at 734; In re Wire Rope Corp. of Am., Inc., 287 B.R. 771 (Bankr.
W.D. Mo. 2002).
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11 to repudiate their labor obligations because the only other option is
liquidating the company, which would then terminate the wages and benefits
for all the employees.
2. Odious Debt Analogy
The core “business” of a sovereign is to protect the safety and provide for
the general welfare of its citizens—not just to have a high gross domestic
product.77 The odious debt doctrine is usually discussed using human-rights or
social-justice terms. However, the essence of the doctrine is the desire to
prevent a financially strapped nation from being forced to continue to struggle
to repay loans that were not used to benefit the nation or its citizens. Even if it
were theoretically possible for a successor regime to use the country’s resources
to repay odious debts over an extended period, the doctrine would excuse the
successor from repaying those debts if doing so would significantly restrict the
nation’s ability to reorganize financially (by paying old debts and attracting new
investments) and civically (by continuing to provide essential services to its
citizens). It is consistent with general insolvency principles, policies expressed in
Code provisions, and the odious debt doctrine to allow a nation saddled with
enormous debts that provided little (or no) benefits to the citizens of the nation
to repudiate those debts if repaying them would render a nation functionally
insolvent and unable to perform the critical functions involved in governing.
United, Delta, Northwest, other airlines, and steel companies ostensibly
could have maintained their legacy costs outside of bankruptcy if they had been
prepared to radically reduce corporate earnings (or, the salaries of their
managers). If these companies had agreed to radically restructure their
businesses and stop flying planes or melting metal they perhaps could have
maintained their legacy costs for a smaller workforce. Just as airlines and steel
companies argued that forcing them to maintain their existing levels of
employee benefits would radically undermine their reorganization efforts, a
new political regime attempting to reorganize and restructure the country’s
debts justifiably could argue that repaying odious debts far into the future
would undermine its restructuring efforts.
In the case of Iraq, a new government cannot be a model for responsible
government in the Middle East, have credibility with its own oppressed
populations, re-enter the international community, or attract new investments if
that government either must tax its citizens, be rendered incapable of investing
in the country’s physical infrastructure, or be unable to provide crucial services
to the Iraqi people. Because calculating the amount of Iraq’s remaining
unrestructured debts owed to non-Paris Club states and its ultimate war debts is
not possible, it is difficult to determine whether Iraq has the capacity to repay

77. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Mons. D’Ivernois (Feb. 6, 1975), in THE WRITINGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 297 (Lipscomb ed., 1903) (“[I]t is to secure our just rights that we resort to
government at all.”); H. Jefferson Powell, Enumerated Means and Unlimited Ends, 94 MICH. L. REV.
651, 662 (1995).
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those debts. Iraq’s oil fields are still quite profitable but currently are in a state
of disrepair. It seems likely, though, that the debts could be repaid if some (or
all) future oil revenues were transferred to existing creditors for an extended
period. However, diverting these revenues to repay those debts might create a
debt overhang that discourages new investment and thus hampers the ability of
the new government to attract new capital.
Countries, like Iraq, that are saddled with enormous debts that fairly could
be construed as odious likely could repay those debts if they neglect or ignore
the health, safety, or educational needs of their citizens. But, just as the airline
and steel companies that filed for bankruptcy to shed their legacy costs would
not have emerged from bankruptcy and been able to perform many of their
prepetition critical functions, a nation saddled with enormous debts that
provided little (or no) benefits to its citizens will be unable to perform the
critical functions involved in governing: to provide security, to build and
maintain physical infrastructure, and to provide other basic services for its
citizens.
Forcing a country to repay odious debts over an extended period might
render it politically insolvent, even if it remained balance-sheet solvent. Letting
a sovereign repudiate odious debts that hamper the country’s political and
financial recovery would be consistent with insolvency principles generally, and
with the Code’s treatment of legacy costs specifically: only a sovereign that
could show that it could not overcome its financial crisis and perform the
business of being a sovereign should be able to repudiate its debts. The
sovereign also would need to show that, in general, it is treating all creditors
fairly and equitably. Moreover, like businesses seeking to reduce or eliminate
their legacy costs, sovereigns would need to show that the creditors could
spread the costs associated with odious debt repudiation better than citizens
could bear the costs associated with repaying the debts. Finally, just as courts
consider whether parties have made good faith efforts to address how a firm’s
legacy costs have affected the firm’s financial condition and how to restructure
those costs, the parties’ good faith also should be considered when deciding
whether a sovereign should be forced to repay odious debts. Bad faith creditors
would be those who knew or should have known that the odious loans were not
used to benefit the citizens and that, as a result, the loans would worsen the
sovereign’s financial situation while providing no (or few) benefits to the
sovereign. It would be consistent with insolvency principles that govern the
treatment of legacy costs to permit sovereigns to repudiate odious debts to
creditors who have not acted in good faith.
Of course, a sovereign’s decision to repudiate prior odious debts might
affect the sovereign’s future ability to borrow or otherwise attract new
investments. However, if—as is true with businesses—lenders are unwilling to
provide future capital to a sovereign because the odious debts create a debt
overhang, sovereigns should be allowed to significantly modify or repudiate the
odious debts in order to give potential lenders or investors an incentive to
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provide future capital. Indeed, letting sovereigns repudiate odious debts might
actually give new lenders an incentive to lend. That is, if lenders understand
that they can in effect eliminate or subordinate old debts by refusing to lend to
a financially distressed sovereign unless the sovereign repudiates the odious
debts or unless they are given a higher priority in payment (or a lien in
sovereign assets), both current and potential future creditors may be more
willing to lend to a sovereign who chooses to repudiate.
In short, allowing sovereigns to repudiate odious debts if repaying those
debts potentially thwarts the sovereign’s ability to effectively reorganize
financially and politically is consistent with the Code’s treatment of legacy costs
for businesses that attempt to reorganize in Chapter 11.
E. The Consumer-Bankruptcy Model and Odious Debt
1. Student Loans
Some businesses that have filed for bankruptcy have gross revenues larger
than some countries’ gross domestic products.78 The most obvious way to “fit”
the odious debt concept within an insolvency framework would thus seem to be
by making analogies to business reorganizations. Yet, despite the myriad
differences between financially strapped people and financially troubled
sovereigns, people and sovereigns share one primary characteristic: both will
continue to exist regardless of whether they repay their debts or how they
restructure those debts upon default. Thus, as another participant in this
symposium has noted,79 analyzing the treatment of sovereign debts using a
consumer bankruptcy lens also can be instructive.
The Code’s treatment of student loans in consumer bankruptcies provides
perhaps the strongest consumer-bankruptcy analogy justifying sovereign
repudiation of odious debts. In general, educational loans are not dischargeable,
and student-loan creditors are favored in bankruptcy.80 Notwithstanding the
78. For example, in November 2006—while Delta Air Lines was reorganizing under Chapter 11—
Delta had U.S. $2.7 billion in unrestricted cash, cash equivalents, and short-term investments. Delta’s
November 2006 net loss was $49 million and its November 2006 operating income was $52 million.
Delta, Delta Air Lines Reports Monthly Results for November 2006, http://news.delta.com/
article_display.cfm?article_id=10501 (last visited Dec. 29, 2006). In contrast, the 2005 Gross Domestic
Product (and the projected 2006 GDP) of Guinea-Bissau—a country that is listed as a heavily indebted
poor country that is eligible for HIPC Initiative assistance from the IMF—was less than a quarter of a
billion. International Monetary Fund, Debt Relief Under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC)
Initiative, http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/hipc.htm (last visited June 30, 2007); USDA
Economic Research Service, Real Historical & Projected Gross Domestic Product and Growth Rate of
GDP
for
Baseline
Countries/Regions
2000-2017,
http://www.ers.usda.gov/Data/Macroeconomics/Data/Projected RealGDPValues.xls (last visited June
30, 2007).
79. Robert K. Rasmussen, Integrating a Theory of the State into Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 53
EMORY L. J. 1159, 1163 (2004).
80. Indeed, a recent amendment to the Bankruptcy Code expands the protections these creditors
receive. That is, until 2005, only loans made, insured, or guaranteed by a governmental unit or
nonprofit institution were protected from discharge. Congress amended the Code to expand those
protections to for-profit lenders. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8)(B) (2000).
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favorable treatment student loans tend to receive, debtors can discharge all or
part of student-loan debts if requiring repayment would impose an undue
hardship on the debtor or the debtor’s dependents.81
Most courts have adopted a three-part undue hardship test that considers
whether (1) based on current income and expenses, the debtor can maintain a
“minimal” standard of living for herself and her dependents and also repay the
loans; (2) additional circumstances exist indicating that the debtor’s financial
state of affairs is likely to persist for a significant portion of the repayment
period; and (3) the debtor has made a good faith effort to repay the loans.82
Other courts use a “totality of the circumstances” test that considers the
debtor’s past, current, and reasonably reliable future financial resources; the
amount of the debtor and the debtor’s dependents’ reasonable, necessary living
expenses; and any other relevant facts or circumstances unique to the particular
case.83 These courts have not precisely defined the minimal standard of living a
debtor and her dependents are entitled to in bankruptcy. They agree, though,
that the debtor must have sufficient resources to satisfy the need for food,
shelter, clothing, and medical treatment.84 Courts routinely stress that “undue
hardship” stops short of debtors’ having to live in abject poverty in order to
discharge their student loans.85
2. Odious Debt Analogy
Whereas the undue-hardship test is designed to be a rigorous one that
prevents most debtors from discharging their loans, it nonetheless could be used
to justify allowing a sovereign to discharge odious debts if forcing it to repay
those debts would cause an undue hardship for the debtor (the sovereign) or for
the debtor’s dependents (the citizens). An undue-hardship test allowing a
country to repudiate odious debts would need to take into consideration the
sovereign’s past, current, and reasonably reliable future financial resources—
most likely its future export revenue and any possible future loans, investments,
or tax revenue. Just as courts consider the amount of a debtor’s dependents’
reasonable, necessary living expenses when deciding whether to discharge a
student loan, whether to allow a sovereign to repudiate odious debts might
depend on the hardship debt repayment would have on its citizens. A sovereign
that could show that repaying the odious debts would make attracting future
investment impossible should be allowed to discharge the debt to avoid
imposing an undue hardship on the citizens of the country. Finally, just as
81. Saxman v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. BJR Corp. (In re Saxman), 325 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. 2003).
82. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Mason (In re Mason), 464 F.3d 878, 881–82 (9th Cir. 2006). Most
circuit courts have adopted this three-part test, originally applied in Brunner v. New York State Higher
Educ. Svcs. Corp. (In re Brunner), 831 F.2d 395, 396 (2d Cir. 1987).
83. Long v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Long), 322 F.3d 549, 554 (8th Cir. 2003).
84. Gill v. Nelnet Loan Servs., Inc. (In re Gill), 326 B.R. 611, 626 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2005).
85. Hornsby v. Tennessee Student Assistance Corp. (In re Hornsby), 144 F.3d 433, 438 (6th Cir.
1998); Doe v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Doe), 323 B.R. 111, 120 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005)
(rejecting the argument that undue hardship should be assessed based on federal poverty guidelines);
Shadwick v. United States Dep’t. of Educ. (In re Shadwick), 341 B.R. 6, 11 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2006).
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bankruptcy courts deciding whether to discharge a student loan consider other
relevant facts or circumstances unique to that case, a sovereign should be able
to show that the debts incurred did not benefit the citizens or that the loan
proceeds had been looted or used for illegal purposes to support allowing it to
repudiate those odious debts.
Some countries, like Iraq, might have significant future earning capacity
based on oil or other exports. If a sovereign’s inability to repay its debts does
not appear likely to persist for the entire loan-repayment period, it should be
allowed to partially repudiate only some of the odious loans or to partially
repudiate only part of all odious loans. For example, it would be appropriate to
allow the sovereign to repudiate penalties or interest on arrears imposed
because of trade or other economic sanctions imposed against a brutal regime if
the sovereign proved that it could not repay all odious debts and penalties
without jeopardizing its ability to restructure financially and to provide basic
services for its citizens.
F. The Principle of Equitable Subordination and Odious Debt
Finally, bankruptcy courts can reorder the priority of payment of creditors’
claims, or can invalidate a lender’s security interest in collateral, under the
theory of equitable subordination. This theory, codified in Section 510(c) of the
Code, allows courts to subordinate a creditor’s claim if the court determines
that the creditor engaged in inequitable or fraudulent conduct, that the
misconduct harmed other creditors or conferred an unfair advantage on the
individual creditor, and if equitably subordinating the claim is not inconsistent
with the Code generally.86 Equitable subordination is an unusual remedy that is
used only in limited circumstances and most often triggered when the creditor is
an insider. Although the misconduct needed to subordinate claims of
noninsiders is greater than the misconduct necessary to subordinate insider
claims, noninsiders also risk having their claims equitably subordinated if their
conduct amounted to fraud, overreaching, or spoliation.87 Courts interpreting
the theory have determined that they can subordinate a creditor’s claim even if
the creditor’s misconduct does not relate to its claim in the bankruptcy case.88
Using the doctrine of equitable subordination to justify the repudiation of
odious debts would give lenders an incentive to engage in due diligence before
making a loan and then to monitor the use of the loan. Creditors who are owed
odious debts should be allowed to demonstrate that they took reasonable steps
to ensure that the loan proceeds were being used to benefit the nation’s citizens
and that the funds were not being diverted to be used by despotic leaders, their
friends, political supporters, or their families. Sovereign debts incurred as the
86. 11 U.S.C. § 510(c)(1) (2000); In re Racing Servs., Inc., 340 B.R. 73, 76 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2006); In
re AutoStyle Plastics, Inc., 269 F.3d 726, 744 (6th Cir. 2001).
87. In re M. Paolella & Sons, Inc., 161 B.R. 107, 119 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1993).
88. In re Racing Servs., 340 B.R. at 77–78; Adam Feibelman, Equitable Subordination, Fraudulent
Transfer, and Sovereign Debt, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. (forthcoming Autumn 2007).
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result of bribes, kickbacks, or the like are easily analogized to claims that are
equitably subordinated in a bankruptcy proceeding.
Even if the lender did not itself engage in inequitable conduct, sovereigns
should be allowed to repudiate odious debts. This debt repudiation is consistent
with the doctrine of equitable subordination if the lender knew or should have
known that the former regime was not using those funds for the benefit of the
citizens because the creditor’s misconduct (here, lending funds that would be
knowingly used for illegitimate purposes) gave it an unfair advantage over other
creditors or generally harmed other creditors. Although a sovereign’s citizens
do not have a traditional lending relationship with the nation-state, they are in
effect its creditors because they essentially serve as guarantors of the
sovereign’s debts. Citizens effectively guarantee the sovereign’s debts because,
upon default, the sovereign will be forced to either tax them to repay the debts
or forgo providing basic services to them if the sovereign cannot afford to repay
old debts, obtain new capital, or provide services to its citizens. Since they
would be harmed if the sovereign repaid the odious debts, they arguably satisfy
the requirement that other creditors are harmed by the inequitable conduct of
the creditor whose claim is being subordinated.
Allowing sovereigns to repudiate debts that are not clearly illegal but that
could nonetheless be deemed odious should, like the subordination of debts in
Chapter 11, be a rare occurrence. Any ex post declarations that odious debts
will be equitably subordinated (to old nonodious debts or to future nonodious
loans) might increase creditors’ reluctance to lend to developing countries or
may increase the costs of those loans. This is a legitimate concern, as is the
concern that imposing additional requirements on lenders to monitor the use of
the loan proceeds will increase the cost of borrowing for sovereigns. While
there is no universally recognized list of “odious regimes,” it is disingenuous to
suggest that international lenders have no way to determine whether a regime is
engaging in activities that harm its citizens and thus making an inappropriate
use of loan proceeds. International organizations, including the United Nations
(through its Security Council) routinely condemn nations that have despotic,
brutal leaders or that otherwise engage in brutal practices. To alleviate the
concerns that these ex post declarations will increase the cost of credit, a
successor government should not be allowed to repudiate all loans to such
regimes. However, the regimes’ lenders can reasonably be on notice of the
international community’s view of the regime and thus be prepared to increase
their monitoring of the loan proceeds. Moreover, just as the World Bank has
recently created a list of countries with corrupt governments to whom it has
refused to lend, it is not unreasonable to expect sovereign lenders to modify
their lending practices to help ensure that they do not knowingly make loans to
sovereigns who use loan proceeds for reasons that do not benefit the
sovereigns’ citizens.
With respect to Iraq, lenders knew or could have known with a reasonable
monitoring process that Hussein was using the loan proceeds for reasons other
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than those provided in the lending agreement. Such lenders should not have
been surprised if their loans were radically restructured or forgiven altogether.
Similarly, such lenders should not have been surprised to find that they would
not be repaid since it was common knowledge that Iraq had long refused to
repay old debts unless the creditors agreed to make large new loans.89 Perhaps
most importantly, since most of Iraq’s lenders were other nation-states—many
in the Middle East—it is simply inconceivable that they did not know (or at
least have reason to suspect) that the proceeds of some of their loans were
being used to benefit Hussein, to finance the invasion of Iran (or Kuwait), to
murder political opponents in Iraq, or to perpetuate genocide. Indeed, for at
least the last thirty years, the international community was on notice that the
Hussein regime consistently and persistently violated the economic, social, and
cultural rights of a significant portion of the Iraqi citizenry. Similarly, it would
have been consistent with the doctrine of equitable subordination to
subordinate the loans made by nations who lent to South Africa during the
apartheid era. When the United Nations Security Council imposed trade
sanctions on South Africa, lenders should have been on notice that at least
some of the money they lent to the apartheid government was used to violate
the human rights of black South Africans. Lenders who continued to loan
money to the old South African government through the 1980s (as many did)
could not reasonably claim that they lacked notice of the potential odiousness
of those post-sanction loans.90
V
CONCLUSION
For now, the international financial community and creditor nations like the
United States have refused to acknowledge—much less publicly endorse—the
odious debt doctrine. Nonetheless, the Bush Administration helped convince
other nations to forgive billions of Iraq’s debts based, in part, on the
Administration’s concern that Hussein used the money to buy arms or build
castles. The persistent push by the human-rights community for formal
acceptance of the doctrine, coupled with public statements by politicians in the
United States and abroad that arguably support the doctrine, will continue to
influence financial restructurings involving sovereigns who inherit odious debts
and should make lenders skeptical when loaning funds to countries who have
brutal, repressive regimes. Just as the parties to an out-of-court debt
restructuring negotiate in the shadow of bankruptcy, the threat of having debts

89. Patrick Cockburn, The Arms for Iraq Scandal: Oil Price Collapse and Iran War Prompted
Credit Crisis, THE INDEP., Dec. 12, 1992, at 8; Gugliotta, supra note 55.
90. The U.N. Resolution urged all member States “to induce transnational corporations, banks and
financial institutions to withdraw effectively from South Africa and prevent them from: (i) Investing in
South Africa . . . ; (iii) Engaging in commercial transactions with South Africa; [and] (iv) Granting
loans and credits to South Africa.” G.A. Res. 42/23, ¶ B1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/42/23 (Nov. 20, 1987),
available at http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/42/a42r023.htm.
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repudiated because of the odious debt doctrine likely will continue to cause
lenders to forgive such debts even if they do not think they have a moral or
philosophical duty—and no actual legal duty—to do so.

